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ABSTRACT
In the United States, workers in cities offering above-average wages – cities with high productivity,
low quality-of-life, or inefficient housing sectors – pay 30 percent more in federal taxes than otherwise
identical workers in cities offering below-average wages. According to simulation results, taxes lower
long-run employment levels in high-wage areas by 17 percent and land and housing prices by 28 and
6 percent, causing locational inefficiencies costing 0.33 percent of income, or $40 billion in 2008.
Employment is shifted from North to South and from urban to rural areas. Tax deductions index taxes
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Wage and cost-of-living levels vary considerably across cities in the United States, yet the fed-
eral tax code does not take this variation into account. Since federal taxes are based on nominal
incomes, workers with the same real income pay higher taxes in high-cost areas than in low-cost
areas, without receiving additional bene￿ts. Recognizing this, the Tax Foundation (Dubay 2006)
argues:
the nation is not only redistributing income from the prosperous to the poor, but from
the middle-income residents of high-cost states to the middle-income residents of low-
cost states.
While the Tax Foundation has suggested a ￿at tax to remedy this problem (Hoffman and Moody
2003), politicians from high-cost areas have proposed indexing federal taxes and bene￿ts to local
costs, arguing that workers with the same real incomes should pay the same nominal taxes.
For federal taxes to not distort the location choices of workers, the correct principle is that
taxes should be independent of where workers live, so that location-wise they are effectively lump
sum. The current system taxes workers more for taking jobs in a higher-paying cities, blunting the
incentive to live in these cities, characterized by high ￿rm-productivity and low quality of life. For
example, intheNewYorkmetropolitanarea, wagelevelsare21percentabovethenationalaverage,
which interacted with an effective marginal tax rate of 33 percent, creates a 7-percent federal surtax
on labor income for locating there. Unlike local tax differences, federal tax differences of this kind
are not compensated with higher levels of local spending, and may therefore affect location choices
substantially.
Because federal taxes are not indexed to local wage levels, workers are induced to leave cities
with high wages and move to cities with low wages. As a result, unindexed federal taxes lower
employment levels and property values in high-wage cities, while having the opposite effect on
low-wage cities. In equilibrium, these price changes compensate workers for federal tax differ-
ences across cities, but the resulting geographic distribution of employment is inef￿cient, reducing
1overall welfare.
The unequal distribution of federal taxes that results from wage differences across cities does
not depend on the progressivity of taxes, and cannot be eliminated with a ￿at tax. The view that
workers with the same real incomes should pay the same nominal taxes holds true across cities that
vary in the productivity of their ￿rms, as nominal incomes merely track cost-of-living differences
across these cities. However, this view is incorrect across cities that vary in quality-of-life as nicer
cities have a higher cost-of-living but lower nominal wage levels, and hence a lower federal tax
burden. Indexing the tax code to local costs would eliminate federal tax differences across cities
that vary in productivity, but exacerbate them across cities that vary in quality of life.
An empirical simulation for the United States below reveals that workers with the sameskills
can pay up to 30 percent more in federal taxes in high-wage cities than in low-wage cities. The
federal government effectively taxes workers for living in large cities, while subsidizing them to
live in rural areas. Taxes also fall more heavily on the Northeast, Paci￿c, and Great Lakes regions
and less on the South. Controlling for socioeconomic disparities, approximately 300 billion dol-
lars each year are transferred horizontally from high-wage areas to low-wage areas. These ￿ndings
partly con￿rm Senator Patrick Moynihan’s claims in 24 years of reports, entitled The Federal Bud-
get and the States, that the "federal balance of payments" across areas is highly unequal, although
these reports do not control for socioeconomic differences across regions, nor do they consider the
effects on local employment or prices.
Journalist Malcolm Gladwell (1996) writes that the inequality in the federal balance of pay-
ments ￿is according to urban experts and economists one of the best-kept secrets in American
politics,￿ and that "the decline of many northeastern American cities may be due not just to mis-
management ￿ as is now popularly imagined ￿ but to the emptying of their coffers by the federal
government." Such a view is supported by the simulation: over the long run, federal taxes have
lowered employment, housing prices, and land values in high-wage areas by 17, 6, and 28 percent,
respectfully, and done the opposite in low-wage areas. Overall, federal taxes have tilted the geo-
graphic distribution of employment away from the North towards the South and away from urban
2areas towards rural areas, creating a welfare loss estimated at 0.33 percent of income, or $40 billion
in 2008. Without federal tax deductions for mortgage interest and local taxes, this loss would be
even larger.
Previous research about how federal taxes interact with local prices contains some important
￿ndings, but has been too narrow or informal to guide policy comprehensively. Wildasin (1980)
￿nds that federal taxes on labor income cause mobile workers to locate inef￿ciently across cities
offering different wages, but focuses on conditions characterizing ef￿ciency, rather than the re-
sults of inef￿ciency. Without referring speci￿cally to taxation, Glaeser (1997) argues that federal
transfer levels should not be tied to local price levels, as this implicitly subsidizes recipients to
live in expensive, high quality-of-life cities. More generally, Kaplow (1995) and Knoll and Grif-
￿th (2003) also allow productivity differences to affect local wages and prices, leading them to
consider the bene￿ts of indexing taxes to local wages. Although insightful, their informal argu-
ments leave open the exact consequences of failing to index the tax code, raising the need for more
rigorous quantitative analysis.1
Section 2 introduces a model of mobile workers who live in cities with attributes that generate
differences in costs-of-living, wages, and federal tax burdens. Section 3 describes the federal tax
differences that arise in equilibrium, and how this affects local prices. Section 4 examines how
taxes distort location decisions and how to calculate the resulting ef￿ciency loss. Then, section
5 considers the effect of indexing taxes to local wages or costs-of-living and demonstrates how
tax deductions for locally-produced goods, such as housing, produce a mild and slightly altered
form of cost indexation. Section 6 calibrates the model and simulates how differential taxes affect
the distribution of local prices, employment, and welfare, taking into account differential federal
spending patterns. Section 7 considers the effect of possible tax reforms, such as cost indexation of
1Kaplow’s (1995) analysis holds prices ￿xed and presents an index formula that does not equalize nominal tax
payments across areas. Knoll and Grif￿th (2003) assume that a ￿at-tax on income does not change prices or reallocate
resources; this assumption, as shown below, does not hold in general equilibrium.
Other work considers how tax deductions interact with local prices. Research by Gyourko and Sinai (2003, 2004)
and Brady et al. (2003) tabulates how mortgage and local-tax deductions disproportionately bene￿t high-cost areas,
but neglects how these deductions may offset the unequal burden of federal taxes from wage differences. Surveys
of the possible bene￿ts of tax deductions for mortgage interest (e.g. Glaeser and Shapiro 2003) or local taxes (e.g.
Kaplow 1996) do not consider their inter-urban locational effects.
3federal taxes, using the simulation. Considerable detail on theory, calibration, data, and extensions
are left to the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Set-Up
To explain why prices and tax burdens differ across cities, I adapt the general-equilibrium model
of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1980, 1982), incorporating federal taxes. The national economy is
closedandcontainsmanycities, indexedbyj, whichtradewitheachotherandshareahomogenous
population of mobile workers. These workers consume a numeraire traded good, x, and a non-
traded "home" good, y, with local price pj. Cities differ in three types of exogenous attributes.
Quality of life, Qj, may be affected by amenities such as weather or safety. Productivity in the
traded-good sector, A
j
X (or "trade-productivity"), may be due to natural advantages, like a harbor,
or to agglomeration economies, such as input-sharing. Productivity in the home-good sector, A
j
Y,
(or "home-productivity") may be affected by natural advantages or regulations affecting residential
housing. The average value of each attribute is set to one.Although some city attributes may indeed
beendogenous, itissafetoconsiderthemexogenousiffederaltaxesdonotsigni￿cantlyaffecttheir
relative levels across cities.
Firms produce traded and home goods out of land, capital, and labor. Factors receive the same
payment in either sector. Land, L, is ￿xed in supply in each city at Lj, and is paid a city-speci￿c
pricerj. Capital, K, isfullymobileandispaidtheprice￿ {everywhere. Thesupplyofcapitalineach
city is denoted Kj, with the aggregate level of capital ￿xed at KTOT, thus
P
j Kj = KTOT. Labor,
N, is also fully mobile, but because workers care about local prices and quality-of-life, wages, wj,
may vary across cities. Workers have identical tastes and endowments, and each supplies a single
unit of labor. The total number of workers is ￿xed at NTOT, so
P
j Nj = NTOT. Workers own




land and I = ￿ {
KTOT
NTOT from capital. Total income mj ￿ R+I+wj varies across cities only as wages
vary. Out of this income workers pay a federal income tax of ￿ (mj). Deductions are introduced
4in Section 5.2
Workers’preferencesaremodeledbyautilityfunctionU (x;y;Q)thatisquasi-concaveandho-
motheticoverxandy, andincreasinginQ. Thecorrespondingexpenditurefunctionise(p;u;￿(m);Q) ￿
minx;yfx + py + ￿(m) : U (x;y;Q) ￿ ug. Q is assumed to enter neutrally into the util-
ity function and is normalized so that e(p;u;￿(m);Q) = [e(p;u) + ￿(m)]=Q, where e(p;u) ￿
e(p;u;0;1).Since workers are fully mobile, their utility must be the same across all inhabited










￿ u is the level of utility attained by all workers, regardless of each worker’s federal tax burden.3
Operating under perfect competition, ￿rms produce traded and home goods according to the
functions X = AXFX(LX;NX;KX) and Y = AYFY(LY;NY;KY), where FX and FY are con-
cave and exhibit constant returns to scale.4 Unit cost in the traded-good sector is cX(r;w;i)=AX ￿
minL;N;KfrL + wN + iK : AXF (L;N;K) = 1g.A symmetric de￿nition holds for unit cost in













Y = Kj. As markets are competitive, ￿rms make zero pro￿ts in equilibrium, so
that for given output prices, more productive cities pay higher rents and wages, so that following












2Because markets are perfectly competitive, the economic incidence is unchanged if the nominal incidence of taxes
is placed on ￿rms’ labor costs, rather than on workers’ wage incomes. Consumption taxes in this model are equivalent
to income taxes; taxes on production are largely equivalent, except for the portion that falls on capital and land.
3The model generalizes to a case with workers that supply different ￿xed amounts of labor if these workers are
perfect substitutes in production, have identical homothetic preferences, and earn equal shares of income from labor.
More general types of worker heterogeneity are considered in Appendix D, including the case where some workers
are immobile, or differ in their attachment to particular cities, simulating the effects of moving costs. This explains
how federal tax changes can have redistributive effects across areas when tastes are heterogeneous or moving costs are
substantial.
4Non-Hicks-neutral productivity differences have similar impacts on relative prices across cities, but not on relative
quantities.
5This analysis models a single federal government that collects tax revenues, makes transfers,
and uses the net balance to buy traded goods that are transformed into a federal public good, such
as defense. This federal public good bene￿ts workers everywhere equally, and its level is held
￿xed. Federal taxes are modeled net of federal transfers.Naturally, federal means-tested bene￿ts
increase the effective marginal tax rate for some workers.5 Additionally, it matters if federal tax
payments are tied to federal transfers. In the United States, workers in high-wage areas pay more
in payroll taxes, and then receive higher Social Security bene￿ts later in life. Thus, the marginal
bene￿t of paying these taxes should be subtracted from the effective marginal income tax rate.
The local public sector does not need to be modeled explicitly. If local government provides
goods ef￿ciently, as in the Tiebout (1956) model, these goods can be treated as consumption goods.
Furthermore, ef￿ciency differences across local public sectors may be subsumed into differences
in Qj (Gyourko and Tracy 1989, 1991) or A
j
Y. Taxes levied at the subnational level can also be
distributed unequally across areas when wages vary within a subnational jurisdiction, such as a
state, but not usually a county or municipality. State taxes are incorporated into the simulation
below, where their effects are small; for expositional ease, they are ignored here.
For workers, denote the expenditure shares of traded goods, home goods, and taxes as sj
x ￿
xj=mj; sj
y ￿ pjyj=mj, and s
j
T = ￿ (mj)=mj; denote the shares of income received from land,
labor, and capital income ass
j
R ￿ R=mj, sj
w ￿ wj=mj, and s
j
I ￿ I=mj. For ￿rms, denote the cost
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as is likely, that home goods are more cost intensive in land relative to labor than traded goods, i.e.,
￿L=￿N > ￿L=￿N:
5This is complicated by eligibility requirements for programs which vary by state or county. Furthermore, some
bene￿t levels are tied to local prices, such as housing programs, although these programs tend to be small. Insomuch as
they are valued, local goods provided by the federal government may be treated as transfers, as can intergovernmental
transfers that increase the supply of local government goods. It should be noted that federal matching rates for many
programs (e.g. Medicaid) decline with average state income. The complicated nature of these transfers makes it useful
to consider some types of federal transfers separately from an overall tax schedule, as in Section 6.4.
63 Price and Federal-Tax Differences across Cities
Federal taxes on labor income affect how prices vary cross-sectionally across cities with different
attributes. To analyze this, assume that there are enough cities varying in the three city attributes,
Q;AX, and AY so we can treat these attributes as continuous variables. The equilibrium conditions
(1), (2), and (3) implicitly de￿ne the prices wj,rj, and pj ￿ and the federal tax, ￿(mj); which




Y. These conditions may be log-linearized to
express a particular city’s price differentials in terms of its city-attribute differentials, each relative
to the national average. These differentials are expressed in logarithms so that, for any variable z,
^ zj = lnzj ￿ ln ￿ z ￿ = (zj ￿ ￿ z)=￿ z, approximates the percent difference in city j of z relative to the
geometric average ￿ z. Values in the presence of income taxes are not subscripted; counterfactual
valuesunderauniform, utility-equivalentlump-sumtaxaresubscriptedbyzero, e.g. ^ z
j
0.Thechange
in z due to income taxes is denoted with a "d," so dzj = zj ￿ z
j
0 and d^ zj = ^ zj ￿ ^ z
j
0. In an average
city ^ zj = ^ z
j
0 = d^ zj = 0.
Log-linearized versions of (1), (2), and (3) describe how prices co-vary with city attributes.
sw ^ w
j ￿ sy^ p
j = ￿
0sw ^ w
j ￿ ^ Q
j (4a)
￿L^ r
j + ￿N ^ w




j + ￿N ^ w
j ￿ ^ p
j = ^ A
j
Y (4c)
These equations are ￿rst-order approximations around a nationally-representative city and so the
share values are national averages. Equation (4a) states how before-tax real income, given by
the nominal income difference, sw ^ wj, net of the cost-of-living difference, sy^ pj, compensates for
lower quality of life, ￿ ^ Qj, and higher federal taxes, ￿0sw ^ wj. This last term is the income tax
differential as a fraction of total income, ￿0sw ^ wj = ￿0 ^ mj ￿ d￿j=m, due to the wage differential
^ wj.For example, if a city offers 10 percent higher wages, the share of income from wages is 75
percent, and the marginal tax rate is 33 percent, then workers of the city pay additional taxes equal
to 2.5 percent of income. The effects of a federal tax differential are similar to that of a head tax
7on workers for living in city j, except that the federal tax differential depends on an endogenous
wage differential, ^ wj; rather than being set exogenously. Equations (4b, 4c) demonstrate how high
productivity in each sector results in high factor prices relative to the output price in equilibrium.
The tax differentials depend on the wage differentials, which may be written
^ w
































X ￿ ￿L ^ Q





relates how wages rise with trade-productivity and fall with quality-of-life or home-productivity.
The ￿rst equality of (5) demonstrates that ￿rms paying a positive wage differential without income
taxes, ^ w
j
0; pay an additional wage differential, d ^ wj, to help compensate for higher income taxes.
The term multiplying ^ w
j
0 after the second equality exceeds one, meaning that income taxes increase
wage differences across cities.6
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As do wages, federal taxes rise with trade-productivity and fall with quality of life or home-
productivity. Spatially, the income tax operates as if the federal government supplemented a uni-
form lump-sum tax with a revenue-neutral system of head taxes, which vary across cities according
to (7).
6The solution requires the identities sR = (sx + sT)￿L + sy￿L and sw = (sx + sT)￿N + sy￿N.:Expressions for
price differentials without taxation equivalent to (6), (9a), and (9b) are found in Roback (1980). Those expressions
are not log-linearized, and ignore non-labor income and the accounting identities.Gyourko and Tracy (1989) develop
expressions similar to (5) and (8a) for wage and rent changes in the presence of local income taxes in the simpler case
where ￿L = 1. Their expressions look very different, as they are not log-linearized or simpli￿ed in the same way.
These analyses do not refer to federal taxes or deductions.
8Land rent and home-good price differentials can be decomposed similarly:
^ r
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Both land rents and home-good prices increase with quality of life and trade-productivity, although
land rents rise and home-good prices fall with home-productivity. (8a) reveals how additional
federal taxes are fully capitalized into land rents as sR ￿ m ￿ d^ rj = ￿d￿j, which implies drj ￿ Lj =
￿Nj ￿ d￿j.7 (8b) reveals how taxes are capitalized into the price of home goods, depending on
their land intensity. Overall, taxes lower relative land and home-good prices in cities with higher
trade-productivity, lower quality-of-life, or lower home-productivity.8
Workers are compensated for higher taxes through a combination of higher wages and lower
home-good prices. Using the expression for d ^ wj in (5) it is possible to show that that the fraction
7If land is not shared equally across the population, increases in the marginal (but not average) tax rate bene￿ts
land owners in low-wage cities and hurts those in high-wage cities. Utilities cease to be equal across workers, but this
does not change the resulting equilibrium if preferences are homothetic.
Ashomegoodsconsistmainlyofdurablehousing, supplyofhomegoodscouldtaketimetoadjusttothisequilibrium
in response to a tax change. In the short-run, the housing supply is relatively ￿xed. A way to model this is to augment
the de￿nition of "land" to include the housing stock, and to increase the effective cost shares ￿L and ￿L: In the
short-run, housing-price changes are larger and employment changes smaller than in the long run.
8The effect of taxes on prices is sensitive to the assumption that attributes are exogenous. This is most conspicuous
with respect to trade-productivity, which increases with overall employment because of agglomeration. Higher federal
taxes cause employment to fall, lowering trade-productivity. This in turn lowers wages, home-good prices, and land
rents, magnifying the effects for the latter two, while dampening (or possibly reversing)the effect on wages. A sim-
pli￿ed example is shown in Appendix D. If quality-of-life falls (rises) with employment, then wage, rent, and price
changes are dampened (magni￿ed). If home-productivity falls (rises) with employment, then wage and price effects
are dampened (magni￿ed), while rent effects are magni￿ed (dampened).
9of taxes compensated through wages, dwj=d￿j, equals ￿L=￿N, denoting the ratio of the fraction of
land in the traded goods sector, ￿L ￿ (1 ￿ sy)￿L=sR, to the fraction of labor in the traded sector,
￿N = (1 ￿ sy)￿N=sw. The less land is used in traded-good production, the less total costs fall
when taxes cause land rents to fall, and thus the less wages increase, and the more lower land rents
are passed on to workers through lower home-good prices. This ratio also determines how much
quality-of-life advantages are re￿ected in lower wages rather than higher prices.9
The effect of federal taxes on local prices can be shown graphically by assuming that home
goods are just land (￿L = 1, AY = 1), so that p = r, and that initially workers everywhere
pay a uniform lump-sum tax of T.Figure 1 illustrates the case of a highly trade-productive city,
say Chicago (labeled "C"), and an average city, say Nashville, with productivities AC
X > 1 and
￿ AX = 1: The zero-pro￿t conditions slope downward as wages must fall as rents rise to keep
pro￿ts at zero. More productive ￿rms in Chicago pay higher wages or rents, placing its zero-
pro￿t condition to the upper-right of Nashville’s. The worker-mobility condition slopes upwards
as wages must rise with rents in order for workers to be indifferent between either city. In the tax-
free equilibrium, shown at ￿ E and EC
0 , Chicago is more crowded than Nashville and pays workers
a differential, wC
0 ￿ ￿ w; to compensate them for the higher cost-of-living re￿ected in rC
0 ￿ ￿ r.
Now replace the lump-sum tax with an income tax set so that workers with an average wage ￿ w,
pay the same amount of taxes, ￿(￿ w + R + I) = T; leaving utility unchanged, although now these
workers face a positive marginal tax rate, ￿0 > 0.With this positive marginal tax rate, workers in
costlier cities must be paid more before taxes to receive the same compensation after taxes, rotating
the mobility condition counter-clockwise around its intersection with the horizontal line at ￿ w, to
its slope of y=(1 ￿ ￿0). Workers in Chicago at the old equilibrium EC
0 are now worse off than in
Nashville, as the old compensating differential does not make up for the higher costs and higher
taxes. Workers will leave Chicago (dNC < 0), lowering the demand for land in both production
and consumption, causing rents to fall by drC, and raising the labor-to-land ratio, causing wages to
rise by dwC. At the new equilibrium, EC, workers are no worse off in Chicago. Firms are no better
9How attributes are capitalized into local prices is discussed in greater detail in Albouy (2009).
10off, since their cost savings in land are passed off to workers in higher wages. By making Chicago
relatively more expensive, the income tax discourages workers from working there, similar to how
taxes discourage work by raising the cost of effort relative to leisure.
The case of a city offering a higher quality-of-life, say Miami, is illustrated in Figure 2. Like
Chicago, Miami is relatively crowded and has high rents, except that as compensation workers
receive a nicer environment rather than a higher wage. Because land is ￿xed in supply and used
in production, local labor demand curves are downward sloping; a larger supply of workers in
the nicer city lowers the wage. This equilibrium is shown in Figure 2, with Nashville and Miami
("M"), each having qualities-of-life ￿ Q = 1 and QM > 1. Both cities have the same productivity,
and so share the same zero-pro￿t condition. Yet, the mobility condition for workers in Miami is
located to the lower-right, as workers are willing to accept lower wages or pay higher rents to live
there. In equilibrium, shown in EM
0 , workers in Miami pay the rent premium rM
0 ￿ ￿ r, and give up
the wage differential wM
0 ￿ ￿ w.
Replacing the lump-sum tax with an income tax, workers in Miami pay less tax as they earn
below-average wages. A worker is more willing to bid down her wage to live in Miami, as a one
dollarreductioninincomeimpliesonlya1￿￿0 dollarreductioninconsumption. Withthiseffective
tax-rebate for quality of life, workers in Miami are made better off. Workers are then induced to
move to Miami (dNM > 0) until rents are driven up by drM and wages are driven down by dwM to
make Miami no more attractive than other cities.To the extent that higher quality of life is bought
through lower pre-tax wages, rather than higher post-tax home-good prices, its tax treatment is
similar to untaxed fringe bene￿ts: ￿rms located in a city by the beach share tax advantages similar
to ￿rms that offer a tax-deductible company car.
The case of a more home-productive city, say Dallas ("D"), may be illustrated simplyby as-
suming p = r=AD
Y < r, as AD
Y > ￿ AY = 1. Lower prices make Dallas workers better off for a given
wages and rents, shifting the mobility condition to the lower right, as in Figure 2. In equilibrium,
wages and home-good prices are lower than in Nashville, although rents are higher.Because Dallas
workers are paid less, they have lower tax burdens, creating the same tax effects as in Miami.
11Federaltaxesonlaborincomemayhavemanydesirableproperties, buttheirburdeniscuriously
distributed across cities with different attributes. By falling more heavily on cities offering higher
wages, federal taxes act like an arbitrary head tax for deciding to live in a city with wage-improving
attributes, whateverthoseattributesmaybe. Thetaxisdistortionarybecauseworkersarearti￿cially
attracted to cities that are nicer to live in, more home-productive, or less trade-productive. At
a minimum, it would be preferable to charge an equivalent tax directly on land according to its
wage-improving attributes: this would affect land rents in the same way, but would not distort
location behavior or other prices.10
4 Employment Effects and Locational Ef￿ciency
Federal taxes not only in￿uence prices, but also cause factors such as labor to move across cities.
By making high-wage cities more expensive to live in ￿ or equivalently, more expensive to hire
in ￿ federal taxes induce workers to move away from high-wage areas towards low-wage areas,
leading to an ef￿ciency loss from misallocating workers across areas.
The employment effect of a differential tax can be written as
d ^ N




where " is the elasticity of local employment with respect to a local, uncompensated tax, written as
a percent of total income. In principle, reduced-form estimates of this elasticity can be obtained.
Furthermore, tax differentials can be obtained directly from data on wages and federal taxes. Thus,
employment effects in (10) can be calculated without referring to a richer theoretical apparatus.
Nevertheless, the theoretical model does imply a structural value for ", which is given and derived
in Appendix A.2.This elasticity is the sum of three long terms, each dependent on a different
10If labor supply is elastic the effect of federal tax differentials cannot be equated directly with head taxes. Real
wages fall with quality of life, and so if labor supply increases with real wages, labor supply is lower in nicer cities,
assuming quality of life and leisure are not substitutes. Thus, in nicer cities workers will work less, and thus avoid
taxes even more, increasing the tax advantage that nicer cities have.
12elasticity of substitution, and is unambiguously negative if ￿L=￿N > ￿L=￿N.
Because workers locate in response to federal income taxes, the resulting spatial distribution
of employment becomes inef￿cient, or "locationally inef￿cient" (Wildasin 1980). In Appendix
A.3, I derive the deadweight loss due to this inef￿ciency by calculating how much revenue the
government loses when it replaces a neutral lump-sum tax with an income tax, holding the utility of
workers constant. Consistent with Harberger (1964), this deadweight loss, expressed as a fraction
of national income, is proportional to half the size of the tax differential times the induced change
in migration, averaged across cities.
DWL











Whatever the distribution of city attributes, this formula captures the entire ef￿ciency loss from
all of the distortions created by unequal geographic taxation, including the indirect distortion on
the location of capital. This does assume that city attributes are unaffected by employment levels.
Furthermore, as d ^ Nj = " ￿ d￿j=m, the deadweight loss can be calculated using only data on " and
the variance of income tax differentials:
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Since d￿j=m = ￿0sw ^ wj, the deadweight loss increases with the variance of wage differences across
cities.
5 Tax Indexation and Deductions
Since federal taxes make workers locate inef￿ciently, it is worth considering policies to remedy
this problem. Taxes can be indexed to either local wages or local costs:the former is better in
theory, but arguably harder to implement, while the latter over-subsidizes life in nicer locations. If
demand for home goods is inelastic, tax deductions for home-good expenditures effectively index
13taxes partially to local costs.
5.1 Wage-Level and Cost-of-Living Indexation
Income taxes may be indexed to wages by dividing taxable labor income by the "pay relative"
1 + ^ wj = wj=￿ w, assuming those pay relatives can be correctly measured. With this indexation, a
worker’s federal taxes do not depend on where she lives, effectively turning the income tax into a
neutral lump-sum tax.
Indexing taxes to local cost-of-living may be easier than indexing taxes to wages as the prices
of homogenous goods across cities may be easier to measure than the prices of homogenous units
of labor. Presumably, taxes would be indexed to local costs by dividing income by an index ￿(pj)
￿ one that ignores quality of life ￿ resulting in taxes ￿ = ￿ (mj=￿(pj)): An ideal cost-of-living
index of this kind is de￿ned in terms of gross expenditures: ￿(pj) = [e(pj; ￿ u) + ￿ ￿]=[e(￿ p; ￿ u) + ￿ ￿],
where ￿ p and ￿ ￿ are the average home-good price and tax burden.
With cost indexation, the tax differential in a city increases with wages and decreases with
home-good prices according to the formula d￿j=m = ￿0 (sw ^ wj ￿ sy^ pj). This changes the mobility
condition (4a) to
sy^ p
j ￿ sw ^ w
j = ^ Q
j=(1 ￿ ￿
0) (12)
With cost-indexed taxes workers are willing to take a larger fall in pre-tax real income to improve
their quality-of-life.Substituting (12) into d￿j=m = ￿0 (sw ^ wj ￿ sy^ pj) reveals that cost-indexed








Relative to taxation without indexation, cost indexation eliminates tax differences across cities
differing in either type of productivity (AX or AY); across these cities, wages rise in step with
costs. Thus, indexing with costs is equivalent to indexing with wages. The drawback to cost
indexation is that in nicer cities workers receive two tax advantages: they owe fewer taxes for
14paying higher prices and for receiving lower wages. The government then massively subsidizes
life in nicer cities. While this may sound like a welfare improving policy, it would actually reduce
welfare as nicer cities would become overcrowded.
5.2 Tax Advantages for Housing and Local Taxes
Thus far, I ignored that the federal tax code confers a number of advantages to housing and goods
provided by local government. Home-owners bene￿t from a number of tax advantages in housing
consumption as they are not taxed for the rent they implicitly "pay" themselves when living in
their own home, and as they can deduct mortgage interest from their income taxes (see Rosen
1985, Poterba 1992). Goods provided by local governments are also subsidized by the federal
government, as local and state taxes can be deducted from federal taxes. Since housing and most
locally-provided government goods, such as education and public safety, are produced locally,
these tax advantages may be thought to apply primarily to home goods.Together, these advantages
may be modeled by allowing households to deduct a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of home-good expenditures,
py, from their federal income taxes, so that taxes paid are ￿ (mj ￿ ￿pjy). ￿ should be less than 1
as these advantages do not apply to certain taxes (e.g. payroll) or to certain home goods, such as
haircuts or restaurant meals. Nor are these advantages available to all workers: many renters and
home-owners do not itemize deductions for mortgage interest or local taxes.
Totally differentiating the tax schedule, the additional tax paid by workers in a city depends










j + ^ y
j￿￿
(14)
Because utility is constant across cities, y falls with p according to the compensated own-price
elasticity for home goods, ￿c < 0, and with higher quality-of-life, so that ^ yj = ￿c^ pj ￿ ^ Qj . With a
price increase of ^ pj, the home-good expenditure share increases by sy (1 ￿ j￿cj) ^ pj. Thus, the tax











With the deduction, the tax differential in (15) depends on two additional effects:
Partial-Indexation Effect The term ￿￿￿0sy (1 ￿ j￿cj) ^ pj describes how taxes change with an in-
crease in the compensated home-good price. If j￿cj < 1 workers in high-cost areas claim
larger deductions, producing an implicit form of price indexation.
Quality-of-Life Income Effect Theterm, ￿￿0sy ^ Qj;re￿ectsthatinnicercities, workersfacehigher
home-goodpriceswithoutbeingcompensatedbyhigherwages. Residentsofnicerareascon-
sume less of all goods, including home goods. With higher Q, home-good expenditures fall
by more than the partial-indexation effect implies, leading to fewer tax deductions.11




Y, and ^ Qj is in Appendix equation (A.17).
With deductions, workers in cities with high trade-productivity or low home-productivity still pay
higher-than-average taxes because the primary wage-tax effect dominates the partial-indexation
effect. It is ambiguous whether workers in nicer cities pay relatively lower taxes with a deduction:
the quality-of-life income effect may override the partial-indexation effect and the wage-tax effect
combined, so that tax burdens could rise with quality-of-life. The calibration below suggests that
taxes still fall with quality-of-life.12
6 Simulation of Tax Differences across the United States
The theoretical model above may be used to simulate the effects of differential federal taxation on
prices, employment, and welfare across the United States. This requires calibrating the economic
11For the reduction in home-goods consumption to be proportional to sy, I assume no complementarities between
y and Q, and that the elasticity of y to income, ￿y;m is equal to one. If ￿y;m 6= 1 then the quality-of-life income effect
is ￿sy￿y;m ^ Q. If y and Q are complements (substitutes), then the effect is smaller (larger).
12The effect of federal taxes on prices or employment with cost-of-living indexation or deductions is determined by
substituting d￿j=m from (13) or (15) into equations (5),( 8a), (8b), and (10).
16parameters of the model and estimating wage, housing-cost, federal spending, and quality-of-life
differentials across metropolitan areas.
6.1 Calibrating the Model
An overview of the calibration is presented here, with greater detail left to the Appendix B. Alter-
native calibrations are considered in several sensitivity checks. Given that parameters are known
with limited certainty, I use round fractions for ease.
Looking ￿rst at income shares, labor, sw, receives 75 percent of income; capital, sI, 15 per-
cent; and land, sR, 10 percent. Housing cost differences are used to measure home-good price
differences. Using this measure requires that the expenditure share for home goods equals the
expenditure share on housing of 22 percent plus the estimated expenditure share on non-housing
home goods of 14 percent, to produce sy = 0:36 ￿ see Albouy (2008) for details. From na-
tional accounts, the government expenditure share, sT, is 15 percent. The cost shares depend on
a number of sources discussed in the Appendix. For traded goods, the cost-share of land, ￿L, is
2.5 percent, the cost share of capital, ￿K, is 15 percent, and the cost share of labor, ￿N, is 82.5
percent. For home goods, the cost-share of land, ￿L, is 23 percent, the cost share of capital, ￿K,
is 15 percent, and the cost share of labor, ￿N, is 62 percent. The cost and expenditure shares are
consistent with the income shares, and imply that the ratio ￿L=￿N, which determines the fraction
of taxes capitalized into wages, is equal to 23 percent.
The compensated own-price elasticity of demand for home-goods, ￿c, is taken from studies de-
tailed in the Appendix, with estimates that center around ￿0:5. The elasticity of employment with
respect to local taxes, ", is taken at ￿6:0 based on two methods, each yielding similar estimates.
The ￿rst is to use direct reduced-form estimates of " from Bartik’s (1991) meta-analysis of the
effect of local taxes on local levels of output and employment, controlling for local public spend-
ing. The second is to infer " by directly calibrating a derived theoretical equation for employment
changes, shown in Appendix B.2, using the above parameters, as well as elasticities of substitution
taken from the literature.
17The marginal federal income tax rate on gross wages, ￿0, of 33.3 percent is equal to the average
marginal tax rate from TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts 1993) of 25.1 percent plus the marginal
payroll tax rate on both the employer and employee sides, net of additional Social Security bene￿ts
(Boskin et al. 1987) of 8.2 percent. The federal deduction level, ￿ , is set at 0:257, which is far less
than one because of renters, non-itemizing owners, non-housing home goods, and the inability to
deduct from payroll taxes.13
Furthermore, I also include state-tax differentials due to the fact that wages, and hence state
tax burdens, vary within state, even though state services do not. Taking into account federal
deductions, state taxes (including income and sales taxes) increase the effective marginal tax rate
on wages by 6.2 percentage points, on average, ranging from 0 points in Alaska to 8.8 percent
in Minnesota. However, wage differences within state are only 44 percent as large, on average,
as wage differences within the entire country.Thus, total tax differences may be approximated by
increasing the federal marginal tax rate by 6:2 ￿ 0:44 = 2:7 points to 36 percent. Exact state tax
differentials are calculated by multiplying the within-state wage differential by the corresponding
state tax rate, and also account for state deductions for housing. Formulas to incorporate state taxes
are presented in Appendix A.
6.2 Estimates of Wage, Price, and Spending Differentials
Wage and home-good price differentials are estimated using 5 percent samples of Census data
from the 2000 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Home-good price differentials
are based on housing costs, as they are a prime determinant and predictor of cost-of-living differ-
ences.Cities are de￿ned at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level using 1999 OMB de￿ni-
tions.Consolidated MSAs are treated as a single city (e.g. San Francisco includes Oakland and San
Jose), as are the non-metropolitan areas of each state. This classi￿cation produces a total of 241
13Effects of a progressive tax system were also explored. A progressive tax schedule increases the variance of tax
differentials, increasing the associated deadweight loss in (11).Because wage differentials are small relative to the
tax schedule, they lead to only moderate changes in tax rates. A generous calculation produced at most a 5 percent
increase in the deadweight burden calculation.
18cities, and 49 state-level collections of non-metropolitan areas. More details are given in Appendix
C.
Inter-urban wage differentials, wj, are calculated from the logarithm of hourly wages for full-
time workers, ages 25 to 55. These differentials control for skill differences across workers to
provide an analogue to the representative worker in the model. Thus, log wages are regressed
on city-indicators, ￿w
j , and on extensive controls, Xw
ij ￿ each fully interacted with gender ￿for
education, experience, race, occupation, industry, and veteran, marital, and immigrant status, in
an equation of the form lnwij = Xw
ij￿w + ￿w
j + "w
ij. The estimates of ￿w
j are used as the wage
differential for city j, and are interpreted as the causal effect of city j’s attributes on a worker’s
wage. Identifying these differentials requires that workers do not sort across cities according to
their unobserved skills. This assumption may not hold completely: Glaeser and MarØ (2001) argue
that up to one third of the urban-rural wage gap could be due to selection, suggesting that at least
two thirds of wage differentials are valid, although this issue deserves greater investigation. At the
same time, it is possible that the estimates could be too small, as some control variables, such as
occupation or industry, could depend on where the worker locates.14
Housing values and gross rents reported in the Census are used to calculate home-good price
differentials, ^ pj. To reduce measurement error from imperfect recall or rent control, the sample
includes only units that were acquired in the last ten years. Price differentials are calculated in a
manner similar to wage differentials, using a regression of rents and values on ￿exible controls ￿
interacted with tenure ￿ for size, rooms, acreage, commercial use, kitchen and plumbing facilities,
type and age of building, and the number of residents per room.Proper identi￿cation of housing-
cost differences requires that average unobserved housing quality does not vary systematically
across cities.15
14Obviously workers do not all have the same endowments and tastes or pay the same marginal tax rate, nor are
they equally sensitive to productivity differences. However, as shown in Appendix D, workers with different tastes and
endowments can be aggregated without serious complications, so long as each is weighted by their share of income
(which is done, although it has little impact on the estimates). Furthermore, many workers report receiving little
income other than labor income. However, given the static nature of the model, a worker’s choices should be modeled
to account for a worker’s permanent income, which includes a large non-labor component, particularly if implicit
rental earnings from one’s own home are included.
15Malpezzi et. al. (1998) determine that similar housing-cost indices derived from the Census perform as well or
19Table 1 presents wage and housing-cost differentials in 2000 for selected metro areas, and by
Census division and metropolitan size. Figure 3 graphs wage differentials against housing-cost
differentials for all metro areas and non-metro areas. Most large cities have above-average wages
and housing costs; and, across cities of the same size, wages and costs tend to be higher in the
Northeast and the Paci￿c. Overall, wages and housing costs are positively correlated, as re￿ected
in the regression line.
As seen in equation (15), the calculation of tax differentials with the deduction requires quality-
of-life estimates, ^ Qj, which reported in Table 1. These are inferred from a mobility condition in
Appendix A.4, similar to (4a) except that it accounts for the deduction. Their inference can be
seen in Figure 3 using the drawn mobility condition across cities with average quality of life: ^ Qj
in a particular city depends on how far its marker is to the right of this condition. Also shown is
a zero-pro￿t condition for ￿rms for an average city where ^ A
j
X = ^ A
j
Y = 0. Without data on land
rents, trade and home-productivity differences are not separately identi￿ed ￿ they do not need to
be for this simulation ￿ although cities above this condition have either high trade-productivity or
low home-productivity.16
To investigate federal spending differentials, data is taken from the Consolidated Federal Funds
Report (CFFR), available from the U.S. Census of Governments. Spending is divided into three
categories: (i) government wages and contracts, (ii) bene￿ts to non-workers, and (iii) other spend-
ing. The ￿rst category consists of federal government purchases of goods and labor services; if
these purchases are made at cost, they should not be considered transfers.17 The second category
includes spending that bene￿ts individuals who are typically inactive in the labor market, such as
retirees and full-time students, including Social Security and Medicare. The remaining category
better than most other indices. Because home-good prices have only a minor effect on tax differentials, and as rent and
housing-price differentials are highly correlated, the simulation is not very sensitive to how housing-cost differentials
are estimated.
16The slope of the mobility condition is sy [1 ￿ ￿￿0 (1 ￿ j￿cj)]=[sw (1 ￿ ￿0)] and the slope of the zero-pro￿t condi-
tion is ￿￿L=(￿N￿L ￿ ￿L￿N). The capitalization of a quality-of-life improvement or a federal tax reduction (modeled
as a head tax) on wages and housing prices is illustrated by shifting the mobility condition to the right. The capital-
ization of an increase in ￿rm-productivity or a decrease in home-productivity is modeled by shifting the zero-pro￿t
condition to the right. Quality-of-life and productivity estimates are presented and explained in Albouy (2008) and
Albouy (2009).
17Weingast et al. (1981) explains when localized spending should be treated as a transfer.
20of other spending is more likely to bene￿t workers according to their location:it includes most
government grants, such as for welfare, Medicaid, infrastructure, and housing subsidies. Spending
differentials are adjusted to control for a limited set of population characteristics in a city, such
as average age and percent minority, to provide a spending differential applicable to a representa-
tive worker. The adjusted differentials for other spending are reported as a fraction of household
income in Table 1.
6.3 Tax Differences and Their Effects
Using the base calibration and estimates of ^ wj, ^ pj, and ^ Qj for 2000, Table 2 reports estimates of tax
differentials and their effects across selected cities, and by Census division and metropolitan size.
A full list is provided in Appendix Table A1. The three components of the federal tax differential
from (15) are in the ￿rst three columns, with the totals in column 4. State tax differentials are in
column 5, and the sum of federal and state tax differentials in column 6. A kernel density estimate
of these total tax differentials is drawn in Figure 4.
The unequal distribution of taxes is substantial: the mean absolute deviation of federal tax
differentials equals 2.6 percent of income, and with state taxes this rises to 2.8 percent. Starting
at an average federal tax rate of 17 percent, a worker moving from a typical low-wage city to a
typical high-wage city sees her average tax rate rise from 14.4 percent to 19.6 percent, paying
over 30 percent more in federal taxes.Although tax differences are compensated for in local prices,
this represents a horizontal transfer of $300 billion (in 2008) from workers in high-wage areas to
similarly-skilled workers in low-wage areas.18
According to the simulation, the tax differential from equation (15) is given numerically by
d￿j=m = 0:271^ wj ￿ 0:017^ pj + 0:040 ^ Qj. Tax differences are driven largely by wage differences,
although price and quality-of-life differences have some effect. Substituting in in the numeric
18The average federal tax rate of 17 percent includes federal income taxes and payroll taxes, appropriately adjusted
(Congressional Budget Of￿ce 2003). Multiplying the mean absolute deviation of federal tax differentials, 0.259, by
personal income in 2008 of $12.11 trillion produces a ￿gure of $313 billion. Using GDP produces $369 billion, or
AGI, $220 billion.
21expression for ^ Qj = ￿0:492^ wj + 0:352^ pj, reduces the tax differential to d￿j=m = 0:254^ wj ￿
0:005^ pj. Empirically, the deductions tend to reduce tax differences across areas. The partial-
indexation effect tends to lower taxes in high-wage areas, while the quality-of-life effect typically
offsets the partial indexation effect slightly. Figure 4 shows how eliminating the deduction would
change the distribution of federal taxes across cities, increasing the tax differential gradient by 12
percent.Thus, without the deduction, the average tax differential would be 3.1 percent, making the
distribution of federal taxes even more unequal.19
Each city’s tax differential depends on its attributes according to the numeric analogue of equa-
tion (7) d￿j=m = ￿0:092 ^ Qj + 0:271 ^ A
j
X ￿ 0:029 ^ A
j
Y.Thus, federal taxes depend most on a city’s
trade-productivity, and somewhat less on its quality of life and home-productivity. Tax burdens
are highest in large cities in the Northeast, Midwest, and Paci￿c, while most small towns and non-
metropolitanareas, particularlyintheSouth, receivealargetaxbreak. Thisappearstohavemoreto
do with productivity differences than quality-of-life differences: the average tax differential from
quality-of-life differences alone would be only 0.4 percent, while the average from productivity
differences alone would be 3.0 percent.
The totaltax differentials are considerable relative to typical differences in local taxes. Any
local of￿cial would consider a permanent three-percent tax on local residents without any com-
pensating services to be a ￿scal calamity. Yet, central governments are imposing this situation
on cities like Chicago, New York and San Francisco. On the other hand, an unconditional grant
of three percent of income in perpetuity dwarfs almost any pork-barrel project. Relative to the
national average, this is what workers in cities like Norfolk and Oklahoma City, as well as most
non-metropolitan areas, effectively receive from the federal government.
These large tax differentials have considerable effects on prices and employment, seen in the
last four columns Table 2. For example, the additional taxes paid to Washington and Albany by
New York City raise wages by 1.6 percent, lower long-run housing costs by 11 percent, and lower
land values by 41 percent. The employment effect is especially striking, stating that employment
19Since the existing tax system has a deduction, the tax differentials with no deduction are based on the counterfac-
tual wage without a deduction; this wage can be determined from the model.
22is 27 percent lower than in an undistorted equilibrium. This effect may seem too large, but it may
be reasonable in the long run, as sizable federal taxes ￿rst affected average workers in World War
II. The rise of the income tax is certainly consistent with the migration of people and jobs over the
last sixty years from the high-wage "rust-belt" to the low-wage "sun-belt" (Kim and Margo, 2004).
The nationwide effects for a number of different calibrations are given in Table 3. The eco-
nomic and tax parameters of these calibrations are displayed in the ￿rst panel, followed by the
mean absolute deviations in outcomes, and the deadweight loss of taxation throughout the econ-
omy. All effects are averaged using the total population size of each area as weights.
The benchmark case, shown in column 1, reveals the overall signi￿cance of differential federal
taxation nationwide. In a typical high-wage city, workers pay 2.8 percent more of their income in
taxes, which causes land values to be 28 percent lower. Workers are compensated for the tax differ-
ential through a 0.9 percent increase in wages, increasing their pre-tax incomes by 0.6 percent, and
a 6.0 percent reduction in the housing prices, re￿ecting a cost-of-living reduction of 2.2 percent.
Thus, workers are compensated for tax differences more through costs than through wages.
The employment effect is quite large at 17 percent. Taken together, the employment effects
create a substantial deadweight loss of about 0.33 percent of income a year, or $40 billion in 2008.
As these numbers are based on a calibrated model, they should not be taken as absolute truth, but
they do provide a sense of the magnitude of the impacts and costs caused by the uneven distribution
of federal taxes.20
Alternative calibrations in Table 3 are shown in columns to the right. In column 2, all land is
devoted to home-good production, keeping the total share of income to land constant: in this case,
wage differentials are unaffected by taxes while home-good price differentials are affected more.
In column 3, the cost shares of land in both sectors are reduced by one-half, with mobile capital
taking up the remaining costs; this doubles the impact on land rents, without changing any of the
other quantities.
20In the base calibration, agglomeration effects could dampen the positive effect of taxes on wages.According to
Rosenthal and Strange (2004), the elasticity of wages with respect to population size due to agglomeration is not likely
to be more than 5 percent. At this level, a 17 percent reduction in employment from taxes reduce wages by 0.9 percent,
which would offset the 0.9 percent predicted increase in wages due to higher land-to-labor ratios.
23Column 4 shows that if " is -9.37, which corresponds to when production and utility are Cobb-
Douglas, the employment effects and deadweight loss are increased proportionally. Column 5
demonstrates that if ￿c is zero, then tax differentials are reduced substantially, as the partial-
indexation effect from the home-good deduction is stronger. Column 6 cuts wage differentials
down to two-thirds their original size, in case unobserved selection makes the estimated differ-
entials too large: this lowers the differential taxes, price and employment effects by a third and
deadweight-loss by ￿ve ninths. Column 7 reveals that if the deduction is ignored, measured tax
differentials are larger. Finally, column 8 looks at the effect of federal taxes only, ignoring state
taxes. Since federal taxes account for 92 percent of tax differences, the effects are only slightly
smaller.
6.4 The Distribution of Federal Spending
The unequal burden of federal taxation would be much less of an issue if it was compensated
for by federal spending differences.To explore this possibility, Table 4 reports coef￿cients from
regressions of spending differentials, both raw and adjusted, on tax differentials in 2000. In the raw
differentials there is a positive correlation with federal purchases (wages & contracts), a negative
correlation with non-worker bene￿ts, and no correlation with other spending, the category closest
to a locational transfer. Once population characteristics are controlled for, correlations for wages
and contracts and non-worker bene￿ts become negative and insigni￿cant, while other spending, as
well as aggregate spending, becomes negatively correlated with federal tax differentials.
Figure 5, which graphs "other spending" differentials against tax differentials, makes it clear
that federal spending does not offset differences in federal taxation. Although the federal govern-
ment makes greater purchases in areas with higher wages, this arises from its need to purchase
skilled labor. Column 9 of Table 3 simulates the effects of tax differentials net of other spending:
these differentials have slightly larger variance, increasing the deadweight loss by a small amount.
Overall, these results establish that federal spending patterns do not offset the pattern of differential
taxation ￿ if anything, they seem to exacerbate this pattern.
247 Simulating Tax Reforms
The simulation above can also be used to simulate the potential bene￿ts of tax reforms that would
affect the geographic distribution of federal taxes, such as wage or cost indexation, or eliminating
the tax advantages of owner-occupied housing. The idea of indexing taxes or transfer programs to
local prices is not foreign to policy makers in Washington. U.S. members of Congress have pro-
posed, but not passed, legislation to index taxes and transfers to regional cost-of-living repeatedly:
the Tax Equity Act, to index taxes, the Poverty Data Correction Act, to index the poverty line, and
the COLA Fairness Act, to index Social Security payments. Some programs are already indexed
to local prices, although most are not. Federal Housing Administration loan insurance is guaran-
teed up to the level of local median home prices. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) public housing and rental vouchers programs use local metropolitan-area income levels
to determine eligibility, in combination with a local index of "Fair Market Rents" to determine
bene￿ts.
Economistshaveputmoreattentionontheideaofreformingtaxadvantagesforowner-occupied
housing and local taxes. The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) recom-
mended cutting tax deductions for local taxes and home-mortgage interest, which would raise
taxes disproportionately in high-cost areas (Anderson et al. 2007). Yet, The Panel also suggested
that mortgage-interest deductions be capped according to local housing prices, which implicitly
provides some cost-of-living adjustment in the tax code. More speci￿cally, if home-mortgage de-
ductions are capped according to local-housing prices, one of two outcomes will occur. If home-
owners purchase below the cap, the effect of the deductions does not change. If home-owners
purchase above the cap, the deduction has effects similar to direct cost-indexation, as residents in
high-cost areas receive a tax rebate proportional to the local housing costs. The degree of this indx-
ation effect depends on how close the cap is to actual housing expenditures, and on the proportion
of cost-of-living differences that depend on housing.
Of course, eliminating deductions would raise the after-tax price of purchasing housing and
local-government goods through local taxes. This would be the ostensible purpose of the reform,
25as home-owners would be treated more like renters, and would no longer have an incentive to
consume housing or local-government goods at an inef￿ciently high level. This distortion, already
heavily studied in the housing market is thought to cause signi￿cant welfare losses (e.g. Rosen
1985, Poterba 1992). While it may be desirable to eliminate deductions to prevent the overcon-
sumption of certain goods, changes in locational ef￿ciency should also be taken into account when
considering such a reform.21
An added complication of simulating the tax reforms is that it is possible for wage or cost-
indexation to occur with or without the tax advantages for housing and local taxes in place. There-
fore, we ￿rst consider the effects of changing these tax advantages before looking at the effects
of indexation, with and without these advantages. Seven different reforms are examined in Ta-
ble 5, which reports the average tax differentials and the deadweight losses due to the locational
inef￿ciency of workers and consumption inef￿ciency due to the overconsumption of housing and
local-government goods22 All reforms are based on the benchmark calibration with the status quo
shown in column 0, which shows that welfare losses due to locational inef￿ciency and to con-
sumption inef￿ciency are almost of the exact same size, or 0.3 percent of income ￿ an intriguing
￿nding, suggesting that locational inef￿ciencies have been understudied relative to consumption
inef￿ciencies.
Columns 1 and 2 examine the consequences of eliminating the deduction entirely, with the
second reform reducing the marginal tax rate so that the overall reform is revenue neutral. Both
reforms eliminate the welfare loss from consumption inef￿ciency. Without the tax cut, eliminating
the deduction would raise taxes in high-wage cities and increase locational inef￿ciency, but with
21If the intention of the cap is to induce individuals to own a home, without inducing them to consume too much
housing, then the cap should be set to less than the typical housing price. To deal with income heterogeneity, the cap
could also change with income as well as location.
22This deadweight loss is given by the formula 0:5￿cshousfitem(￿hous￿0)2 where shous is the fraction of expendi-
tures spent on housing, fitem is the fraction of households who itemize, and ￿hous is the deduction level applicable to
housing. Note that ￿ is set so that shousfitem￿hous = sy￿.
Technically, this formula does not apply to this setting as it is based on a partial equilibrium analysis with a perfectly
elastic supply of housing. The setting here is in general equilibrium with an imperfectly elastic supply of housing, as
land is ￿xed in supply. Incorporating these supply conditions, using the standard Harberger (1962) approach, reduces
the effective elasticity, and the deadweight-loss, by approximately 10 percent. The formula also assumes that there are
no pre-existing distortions in the housing market, such as those due to property taxes.
26the tax cut the locational inef￿ciency would be the same as in the status quo. Thus, the tax
advantages reduce locational inef￿ciencies if the tax rate is held ￿xed, but are close to locationally
neutral if accompanied with an offsetting decrease in overall tax rates. In column 3, the deduction
is increased to 100 percent and applied to all goods that vary in price across location, but is also
accompanied by signi￿cant tax hike to keep revenues constant. This reform reduces locational
inef￿ciency by a small amount, but creates a very large increase in consumption inef￿ciency.
Column 4 presents the case where taxes are indexed to local wages and the deduction is elim-
inated with an offsetting tax reduction: in this ideal case neither inef￿ciency arises. In column
5, taxes are indexed to local costs, while the deduction is eliminated: interesting this proves to
improve locational ef￿ciency relative to the comparable situation in column 2 without indexing.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, cost-indexation reduces ta differences between areas than differ in
productivity but increases them between areas that differ in quality of life: empirically, the former
effect dominates the latter ￿ a very interesing ￿nding. Columns 6 and 7 index taxes to wages
and cost-of-living with the deduction in place. With wage-indexation and the deduction, a slight
locational inef￿ciency arises solely because of the deduction.23 In column 7, the locational bene￿ts
of cost-indexation are greatly reduced, since nicer areas are even more heavily subsidized. Thus, it
appears that if tax advantages for housing and local taxes are kept in places, then cost-indexation
would do little to improve locational ef￿ciency, while wage-indexation would do so signi￿cantly.
8 Conclusion
Any tax on labor income creates an incentive for workers to leave high-wage areas in favor of low-
wage areas. Even though mobile workers should be compensated for the resulting tax differences
throughadjustmentsinlocalpricesandwages, theresultinggeographicdistributionofemployment
will be distorted, causing a substantial welfare loss.
The simulated effects of federal taxes on prices, employment and welfare are based on the
23If there were no true wage differences across cities to produce the wage-tax effect, this number could be added to
the deadweight loss from the favorable tax-treatment of home goods.
27assumption that city attributes are unaffected by population movements. When city attributes are
affected by population size, these effects could be smaller or larger than predicted. Furthermore,
the distribution of city sizes may no longer be optimal even in the absence of federal taxes, which
could ameliorate or aggravate pre-existing distortions. Given the complexities of dealing with
endogenous attributes, these issues are left for further work.
Politicians who represent high-wage areas may legitimately complain that their districts pay a
disproportionate share of federal taxes. However, in most countries, reforms to equalize the fed-
eral tax burden across areas would likely meet ￿erce political opposition. In the United States,
highly-taxed areas tend to be in large cities inside of populous states, which have low Congres-
sional representation per capita, making the prospect of reform daunting. In other countries, such
as Canada, rural areas also receive disproportionate representation in national legislatures. Nev-
ertheless, when considering federal tax reforms, policy-makers should be aware of their spatial
consequences on local prices, employment, and welfare.
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35Pop. Hous. Fed.
Size Wage Cost QOL Spend
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Metro Area
San Francisco, CA 7,039,362 0.26 0.75 0.13 0.011
New York, NY 21,199,865 0.21 0.42 0.04 -0.003
Detroit, MI 5,456,428 0.13 0.09 -0.04 -0.009
Chicago, IL 9,157,540 0.14 0.22 0.01 0.001
Hartford, CT 1,183,110 0.15 0.15 -0.03 0.003
Boston, MA 5,819,100 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.000
Washington, DC 7,608,070 0.13 0.17 -0.01 0.006
Philadelphia, PA 6,188,463 0.13 0.40 0.07 -0.003
Los Angeles, CA 16,373,645 0.12 0.07 -0.04 0.003
Minneapolis, MN 2,968,806 0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.019
Jacksonville, FL 1,100,491 -0.07 -0.09 0.01 0.006
San Antonio, TX 1,592,383 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 -0.005
Oklahoma City, OK 1,083,346 -0.12 -0.21 -0.01 -0.006
Norfolk VA 1 569 541 -01 1 -00 7 00 3 -0 013
TABLE 1: WAGE, HOUSING-COST, QUALITY-OF-LIFE, AND 
FEDERAL-SPENDING DIFFERENCES ACROSS AREAS, 2000
Adjusted Differentials
Norfolk, VA 1,569,541 -0.11 -0.07 0.03 -0.013
Joplin, MO 157,322 -0.25 -0.42 -0.02 -0.008
Census Division
Pacific 45,042,272 0.10 0.36 0.08 0.001
Middle Atlantic 39,668,438 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.000
New England 13,928,540 0.07 0.18 0.03 -0.002
East North Central 45,145,135 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.003
South Atlantic 51,778,682 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.001
Mountain 18,174,904 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.002
West South Central 31,440,101 -0.07 -0.21 -0.04 0.001
West North Central 19,224,096 -0.11 -0.25 -0.03 0.006
East South Central 17,019,738 -0.12 -0.30 -0.04 0.000
Metro Population
Pop > 5 Million 81,606,427 0.16 0.32 0.03 0.000
Pop 1.5-4.9 Million 55,543,090 0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.005
Pop 0.5-1.4 Million 40,499,870 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.000
Pop < 0.5 Million 36,417,747 -0.09 -0.15 -0.01 -0.002
Non-Metro Areas 67,354,772 -0.14 -0.28 -0.03 0.005
US Standard Dev 0.13 0.29 0.05 0.011
US Mean Abs Dev 0.11 0.24 0.04 0.008Tax State Total
Pay- Tax Tax
ment Wage Partial QOL Total Differ- Differ- Hous. Land Employ-
Rank Effect Index Income Federal ential ential Wage Cost Rent ment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Metro Area
1 San Francisco, CA 0.068 -0.012 0.005 0.061 0.007 0.068 0.020 -0.145 -0.676 -0.406
2 New York, NY 0.054 -0.007 0.002 0.049 0.004 0.053 0.016 -0.113 -0.527 -0.316
3 Detroit, MI 0.035 -0.001 -0.001 0.032 0.004 0.036 0.011 -0.078 -0.365 -0.219
4 Chicago, IL 0.035 -0.003 0.000 0.032 0.004 0.036 0.011 -0.077 -0.361 -0.216
5 Hartford, CT 0.039 -0.002 -0.001 0.036 0.000 0.036 0.011 -0.076 -0.356 -0.214
6 Boston, MA 0.035 -0.005 0.002 0.032 0.002 0.033 0.010 -0.072 -0.335 -0.201
7 Washington, DC 0.034 -0.003 0.000 0.031 0.002 0.033 0.010 -0.072 -0.333 -0.200
8 Philadelphia, PA 0.030 -0.001 -0.001 0.028 0.002 0.030 0.009 -0.064 -0.300 -0.180
9 Los Angeles, CA 0.033 -0.006 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.029 0.009 -0.063 -0.292 -0.175
10 Minneapolis, MN 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 0.021 0.007 0.028 0.008 -0.059 -0.276 -0.166
110 Jacksonville, FL -0.019 0.001 0.000 -0.017 0.000 -0.017 -0.005 0.036 0.170 0.102
133 San Antonio, TX -0.023 0.003 -0.001 -0.021 -0.001 -0.022 -0.007 0.048 0.223 0.134
147 Oklahoma City, OK -0.032 0.003 0.000 -0.029 0.003 -0.026 -0.008 0.056 0.260 0.156
172 Norfolk, VA -0.028 0.001 0.001 -0.026 -0.004 -0.030 -0.009 0.063 0.295 0.177
241 Joplin, MO -0.066 0.006 -0.001 -0.060 -0.006 -0.066 -0.020 0.142 0.660 0.396
TABLE 2: TAX DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS AREAS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON PRICES AND EMPLOYMENT, 2000
Federal Tax Differential Total Tax Differential Effects
Deduction Effects
241 Joplin, MO 0.066 0.006 0.001 0.060 0.006 0.066 0.020 0.142 0.660 0.396
Census Division
1 Pacific 0.026 -0.006 0.003 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.007 -0.049 -0.228 -0.137
2 Middle Atlantic 0.021 -0.002 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.019 0.006 -0.040 -0.188 -0.113
3 New England 0.017 -0.003 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.005 -0.033 -0.155 -0.093
4 East North Central 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004
5 South Atlantic -0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.016 0.073 0.044
6 Mountain -0.013 0.000 0.001 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 -0.004 0.026 0.121 0.073
7 West South Central -0.019 0.003 -0.001 -0.017 0.000 -0.017 -0.005 0.036 0.167 0.100
8 West North Central -0.029 0.004 -0.001 -0.026 0.000 -0.026 -0.008 0.056 0.263 0.158
9 East South Central -0.030 0.005 -0.002 -0.027 0.000 -0.027 -0.008 0.058 0.269 0.161
Metro Population
1 Pop > 5 Million 0.041 -0.005 0.001 0.037 0.003 0.040 0.012 -0.086 -0.400 -0.240
2 Pop 1.5-4.9 Million 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.003 -0.018 -0.083 -0.050
3 Pop 0.5-1.4 Million -0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.015 0.068 0.041
4 Pop < 0.5 Million -0.022 0.002 0.000 -0.020 -0.002 -0.022 -0.007 0.048 0.223 0.134
5 Non-Metro Areas -0.036 0.004 -0.001 -0.033 -0.003 -0.036 -0.011 0.077 0.360 0.216
US Standard Dev 0.034 0.004 0.002 0.031 0.004 0.033 0.010 0.071 0.332 0.199



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All and Worker Other
Type of Federal Spending Spending Contracts Benefits Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Raw Differentials
Federal Tax Differential -0.094 0.281 -0.223 -0.019  
(standard error) (0.132) (0.099) (0.061) (0.047)
Panel B: Adjusted Differentials
Federal Tax Differential -0.193 -0.072 -0.024 -0.075  
(standard error) (0.101) (0.066) (0.018) (0.033)  
TABLE 4: DIFFERENTIAL FEDERAL SPENDING PATTERNS RELATIVE
TO DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION PATTERNS, 2000
(standard error) (0.101) (0.066) (0.018) (0.033)  
Regressions weighted by population for all 290 observations. 
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FIGURE 5: FEDERAL SPENDING AND TAX DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS AREAS